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This paper explores the optimal income tax treatment of couples. Each couple is modelled as 
a single agent supplying labor along two dimensions: primary-earner and secondary-earner 
labor supply. We consider fully general nonlinear income tax schedules which creates a multi-
dimensional screening problem. We prove that, under regularity and separability assumptions 
for utility functions and for a wide class of social welfare functions, optimal tax schemes 
display negative jointness such that the tax rate on one person decreases in the earnings of the 
spouse. We also show that the tax on the secondary earner tends to zero asymptotically as the 
earnings of the primary earner becomes large. These results are valid both in models where 
secondary earners make only a binary labor supply choice (work or not work), and in models 
where both spouses make continuous labor supply decisions. In the latter case and in contrast 
to the multi-dimensional screening monopoly model, the optimal tax system is regular 
everywhere with no bunching for a wide set of parameters. 
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The purpose of this paper is to explore the optimal income taxation of couples. Following
the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1971), optimal income tax theory has focused almost
exclusively on redistribution across individuals. The small set of papers which do consider
couples usually assume separability in the couple tax function, and hence cannot fully address
the desirability of joint versus individual taxation, nor investigate the optimal form of jointness.1
In this paper, we impose no a priori restrictions on the income tax system allowing it to depend
on the earnings of each spouse in any nonlinear fashion. This is a multi-dimensional screening
problem where agents (couples) are characterized by a multi-dimensional parameter (ability and
taste-for-work parameters of each spouse) that are unobserved by the principal (the government
which maximizes social welfare).
Due to the technical diﬃculties involved, there are very few studies in the optimal tax
literature attempting to deal with multi-dimensional screening problems. Mirrlees (1976, 1986)
set out a general framework to study such problems and derived ﬁrst-order conditions for an
incentive scheme to be optimal, but he did not attempt to characterize the shape of optimal
tax schedules and he did not consider speciﬁcally the important case of family taxation.2 The
nonlinear pricing literature in the ﬁeld of Industrial Organization has investigated a number of
aspects of multi-dimensional screening problems. Wilson (1993), Armstrong and Rochet (1999),
Rochet and Stole (2003), Basov (2005) survey this literature. A central complication of multi-
dimensional screening problems is that, in contrast to one-dimensional problems, ﬁrst-order
conditions are not always suﬃcient to characterize the optimal solution. The reason is that
solutions usually display ‘bunching’ at the bottom (Armstrong, 1996; Rochet and Choné, 1998),
whereby agents of diﬀerent types are forced to make the same choices.
Our paper tackles these complexities in the following ways. First, we consider a framework
with a binary labor supply outcome (work or not work) for the secondary earner along with
1Rosen (1977) and Pechman (1987) provide informal arguments about the issue. Boskin and Sheshinski (1983)
considered a formal linear taxation problem of couples allowing for the possibility of selective marginal tax rates
on husband and wife. The linearity assumption eﬀectively implies separable and hence individual-based (albeit
gender speciﬁc) tax treatment. Their problem is formally identical to a many-person Ramsey optimal tax problem.
More recently, Schroyen (2003) and Alesina and Ichino (2007) have extended the Boskin-Sheshinski framework to
the case of nonlinear taxation but keeping the assumption of separability in the tax treatment.
2More recently, Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet (2001) revisited the issue of commodity versus income taxation in
a multi-dimensional screening model assuming a discrete number of types. Brett (2006) and Cremer, Lozachmeur
and Pestieau (2006) consider the issue of couple taxation in discrete-type models. They show that, in general,
incentive compatibility constraints bind in complex ways making it diﬃcult to obtain general properties. Cremer
et al. (2006) show that fully joint taxation is optimal only under very restrictive assumptions.
1continuous earnings for the primary earner, allowing us to obtain an intuitive understanding
of the shape of optimal schedules based on graphical exposition. Second, in a model featuring
continuous earnings for both spouses, we show analytically that there is no bunching when
redistributive tastes are moderate. Third, in both the continuous and the binary settings,
we are able to obtain qualitative properties of optimal schedules which are relevant to tax-
transfer policy and which, because of the bunching complications mentioned above, have not
been obtained in nonlinear pricing theory.
As in the nonlinear pricing literature, we make a number of simplifying assumptions to be
able to make progress in our understanding of optimal schedules. In particular, our framework
is based on the unitary approach whereby each couple is modelled as a single agent supplying
labor along two dimensions: the labor supply of a primary earner and the labor supply of a
secondary earner.3 We consider only couples and do not model the marriage decision.4 We
assume no income eﬀects on labor supply and separability in the disutility of working for the
two members of the household, implying that there is no jointness in the family utility function
as such. Instead, jointness eﬀects in our model arise because the social welfare function depends
on family utilities rather than individual utilities, and because of a potential correlation in spouse
abilities (assortative mating). As we shall see, our assumptions allow us to zoom in on the role
of equity concerns for the jointness of the tax system. We obtain the following two main results.
First, assuming uncorrelated abilities across spouses, we show that optimal incentive schemes
feature negative jointness deﬁned as a situation where the tax rate on one person depends nega-
tively on the earnings of the spouse. In the binary model, this implies that the participation tax
rate on the secondary earner is decreasing in primary earnings. The intuition can be understood
as follows. At a given level of primary earnings, the government values redistribution from two-
earner couples to one-earner couples, because two-earner couples have a higher total income and
tend to be better oﬀ. This requires a positive participation tax on the secondary earner. How-
ever, because the second-earner contribution to couple utility is declining in importance as the
primary earner ability becomes larger, the redistributive virtue of taxing secondary earnings is
also declining. As a result, the optimal second-earner tax is declining in primary earnings. This
negative jointness result carries over to the continuous model, where we present a proof that, in
any no-bunching solution, the couple tax liability as a function of spousal earnings displays a
3We adopt the unitary approach because it is the simplest tool of analysis, acknowledging that this model
conﬂicts with empirical evidence (e.g. Lundberg et al., 1997). In Section 4, we discuss the implications of
adopting a more realistic model of family labor supply.
4We discuss the implications of endogenous marriage brieﬂy in Section 4.
2negative cross-derivative everywhere. We are able to demonstrate that bunching does not occur
as long as redistributive tastes are moderate.
Second, we analyze the asymptotics of optimal tax schemes as primary earnings become
large, and show that, for a wide class of social welfare objectives, the tax distortion on the
secondary earner tends to zero in the limit. In other words, the earnings of wives married to the
highest-income husbands should be exempted from taxation. Although this statement may seem
reminiscent of the classic result that optimal tax schemes display no distortion at the top, our
result rests on a diﬀerent logic and may be seen as an extension of the negative jointness result.
A positive tax on secondary earners amounts to redistributing from two-earner couples to one-
earner couples. But for couples with very large primary earnings, second-earner participation has
an e g l i g i b l ee ﬀect on family utility, implying that redistribution from two-earner to one-earner
couples has no value to the government in the limit.
The desirability of negative jointness may seem surprising at ﬁrst glance. Indeed, a progres-
sive family based income tax system, as used in for example the United States, is associated
with positive jointness and progressive individually based income tax system is associated with
zero jointness. However, it is important to note that most OECD countries, including those
which have moved to individual income tax ﬁling, also operate family-based means-tested wel-
fare programs with transfers being phased out with joint family income. The combination of
an individual income tax and a joint welfare system creates negative jointness. To see this,
consider a secondary earner, say the wife, deciding about labor market entry. If she is married
to a low-income husband, the family is in the phase-out range of transfer programs, and she will
face a high eﬀective tax rate. On the other hand, if she is married to a high-income husband,
the family is beyond the phase-out range of transfer programs, and she will face a low eﬀective
tax rate because the income tax is individual. Hence, the wife’s tax is declining in the husband’s
earnings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the binary model where
secondary earners respond only along the extensive margin, while Section 3 extends our results
to the continuous model where both spouses are modelled symmetrically and respond along the
intensive margin. Section 4 discusses model extensions and Section 5 concludes.
32 A Binary Labor Supply Choicef o rt h eS e c o n d a r yE a r n e r
2.1 Labor Supply Model
We start by setting out a simpliﬁed labor supply model for couples allowing us to derive explicit
optimal tax formulas which can be compared directly to Mirrlees (1971). In each couple, there
is a primary earner who always participates in the labor market and makes a choice about the
size of labor earnings z. As in the Mirrlees (1971) model, the primary earner is characterized by
a scalar ability parameter n which is heterogeneous in the population and cannot be observed by
t h eg o v e r n m e n t .T h ec o s to fe a r n i n gz for a primary earner with ability n is given by n·h(z/n),
where h(.) is an increasing and convex function of class C2 and normalized so that h(0) = 0 and
h0(1) = 1. Secondary earners choose whether or not to participate in the labor market, l =0 ,1,
but hours worked conditional on working are ﬁxed. Their labor income is given by w · l,a n d
they face a ﬁxed cost of work q if l =1 . In this simpliﬁed model, we assume that secondary
earners are identical with respect to the wage rate w, but allow for heterogeneity with respect
to the ﬁxed cost q which is unobserved by the government. Our model implies that primary
earners respond to taxes only along the intensive margin, whereas secondary earners respond
only along the extensive margin. The main reason for introducing this asymmetric model is
for simplicity of exposition and to allow us to understand the intuition behind our key negative
jointness result.5
We assume that couple characteristics (n,q) are distributed according to a continuous den-
sity distribution deﬁned over [n, ¯ n] × [0,∞).W ed e n o t eb yP(q|n) the cumulative distribution
function of q conditional on n, p(q|n) the density function of q conditional on n,a n df(n) the
unconditional density of n. We normalize the size of the total population to one.
Because the government cannot observe n and q, it has to base redistribution solely on ob-
served earnings using a non-linear tax system T (z,wl).B e c a u s el is binary and w is uniform,
this tax system simpliﬁes to a pair of schedules, T0(z) and T1(z), depending on whether the
spouse works or not. The tax system is separable if and only if T0
0 = T0
1 everywhere or, equiva-
lently, if T0 and T1 diﬀer by a constant. Net-of-tax income for a couple with earnings (z,w·l) is
given by c = z +w·l−Tl(z). The utility function for a couple whose primary earner has ability
5We show in Section 3 that our results extend to a symmetric model where both spouses respond along the
extensive margin. It should be noted, however, that because of ﬁxed costs of work (due to child care for example),
secondary earners’ labor supply responds primarily along the extensive margin (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999
for a recent survey).
4n and whose secondary earner has a ﬁxed cost of work q takes the quasi-linear form




− q · l. (1)
The couple chooses (z,l) so as to maximize utility (1) subject to its budget constraint c =
z + w · l − Tl(z).
A number of important assumptions are embodied in this speciﬁcation of the couple’s prob-
lem. First, the quasi-linear utility speciﬁcation implies no income eﬀects on the labor supply
of either spouse. As is well known from the nonlinear multi-product pricing literature (e.g.,
Wilson, 1993), and shown more recently by Diamond (1998) in the context of optimal nonlinear
income taxation, ruling out income eﬀects simpliﬁes greatly the theoretical analysis.6 Second,
we assume that the disutility of work is separable for the two spouses. This assumption would
be violated if spouses like to spend leisure time together, and it may be violated if the husband’s
and wife’s time are combined in household production processes to generate commodities within
the home.7,8 Third, our model is equivalent to a single decision maker optimizing along two
dimensions, z and l, implying that there is no conﬂict in the family regarding consumption or
labor supply choices.9 Fourth, since we consider a model with only couples, we do not account
for the potential eﬀect of taxes on marriage decisions.10 T ob es u r e ,t h i si sas e to fv e r ys t r o n g
assumptions. However, the simplicity of our model allows us to zoom in on reasons for jointness
driven by social preferences for equity. In Section 4, we discuss in some detail how relaxing a
number of these assumptions would aﬀect our results.







In the case of no tax distortion, T0
l(z)=0 , our normalization assumption h0(1) = 1 implies
6The empirical labor market literature tends to ﬁnd small income eﬀects (e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999),
but the empirical identiﬁcation of income eﬀects is not as compelling as the identiﬁcation of substitution eﬀects.
In particular, it is perceivable that primary earnings have important income eﬀects on secondary earners’ work
decisions.
7Notice also that, since assumptions one and two together imply independence between spouses in the utility
function, we are stacking the cards in favor of separable taxation.
8Piggott and Whalley (1996) extended the Boskin-Sheshinski linear tax model to incorporate home production,
making the point that selective marginal tax rates on spouses leads to a distortion in the household production
input mix.
9This stands in contrast to the recent literature on collective labor supply decisions (following the seminal
contributions by Chiappori 1988, 1992) modelling couples as two individual utility maximizers interacting with
one another. The single decision maker hypothesis provides a useful and simpler benchmark for our analysis.
10However, the empirical magitude of such eﬀects seems to be quite modest (Alm and Whittington, 1999; Eissa
and Hoynes, 2000).
5z = n. Hence, it is natural to interpret n as potential earnings.11 Positive marginal tax rates
depress actual earnings z below potential earnings n. If the tax system is non-separable such
that T0
0 6= T0
1, there will be an interdependence between the earnings choice z of the primary
earner and the labor force participation decision l of the spouse. We denote by zl the optimal
choice of z at a given l. If the tax system is separable, T0
0 = T0
1,w eh a v ez0 = z1.













B e c a u s ew eh a v ea s s u m e da w a yi n c o m ee ﬀects, the compensated and uncompensated elasticities
of labor supply are of course identical. With separable taxation so that z0 = z1,w eh a v eε0 = ε1.
For the secondary earner to enter the labor market and work, the utility from participation
must be greater than or equal to the utility from non-participation. Let us denote by




+ w · l, (4)
the indirect utility of the couple (exclusive of the ﬁxed work cost q)a tag i v e nl.D i ﬀerentiating














The participation constraint for secondary earners is given by
q ≤ V1(n) − V0(n) ≡ ¯ q, (6)
where ¯ q is the net gain from working exclusive of the ﬁx e dw o r kc o s tq. For families with a ﬁxed
cost below (above) the threshold-value ¯ q, the secondary earner works (does not work).12 The
probability of labor force participation for the secondary earner at a given ability level n of the
primary earner is given by P (¯ q|n).W e d e ﬁne the participation elasticity with respect to the







To complete the description of the household, we need to deﬁne a tax rate on second-earner
participation. Since w is the gross gain from working, and ¯ q has been deﬁned as the (money
11In general, economists consider models where n is a wage rate and where u = c−h(z/n),w h i c hl e a d st oaﬁrst
order condition 1−T
0(z)=n·h
0(z/n). Our results would carry over to this standard model but n could no longer
be interpreted as potential earnings and the interpretation of optimal tax formulas would be less transparent (see
Saez (2001)).
12If the tax function is non-separable (so that z0 6= z1), the value of ¯ q and hence the participation decision of
the secondary earner will depend on the earnings choice of the primary earner.
6metric) net utility gain from working, we can deﬁne this tax rate as τ =( w − ¯ q)/w.N o t i c e
that, if taxation is separate so that T0
0 = T0
1 and z0 = z1,w eh a v eτ =( T1 − T0)/w.O n t h e
other hand, if taxation is non-separate, then T1 −T0 reﬂects the total tax change for the family
when the secondary earner starts working and the primary earner does an associated earnings
adjustment, whereas the w − ¯ q reﬂects the tax burden on second-earner participation as such.
It is easy to prove the following (using eqs 4-6):
Lemma 1 At any point n, we have:
• T0
0 >T0
1 ⇐⇒ z0 <z 1 ⇐⇒ ˙ τ<0
• T0
0 = T0
1 ⇐⇒ z0 = z1 ⇐⇒ ˙ τ =0
• T0
0 <T0
1 ⇐⇒ z0 >z 1 ⇐⇒ ˙ τ>0
This lemma is simply another way of stating the theorem of equality of cross-partial deriv-
atives. We naturally say that a tax system has positive jointness if τ is increasing in n and
negative jointness if τ is decreasing in n.I f τ is constant, the tax system is separable. These
deﬁnitions can be either local (at a given n)o rg l o b a l( f o re v e r yn).
It is important to note that double-deviation issues are taken care of in our model, because
we consider earnings at a given n and allow z to adapt optimally when l changes. That is, if
the secondary earners starts working, optimal primary earnings shift from z0(n) to z1(n) but
the key ﬁrst-order condition (5) continues to apply. More precisely, it is easy to show, exactly
as in the Mirrlees (1971) model, that a given path for (z0(n),z 1(n)) can be implemented via a
truthful mechanism or equivalently with a non-linear tax system if and only if z0(n) and z1(n)
are non-negative and non-decreasing in n (see Kleven et al., 2006, for details).
2.2 Government Objective
As usual in optimal income tax models, the government maximizes a social welfare function de-
ﬁned as the sum of concave and increasing transformations Ψ(.) of the couples’ utilities subject to
a government budget constraint and the constraints imposed by household utility maximization.






Ψ(Vl(n) − q · l)p(q|n)f(n)dqdn, (8)





Tl(zl)p(q|n)f(n)dqdn ≥ 0, (9)
7and subject to ˙ V0(n) and ˙ V1(n) i n e q .( 5 ) .W e d e n o t e b y λ the multiplier of the budget
constraint (9). Nothing would change in the analysis if we assumed a positive exogenous revenue
requirement for the government.
We may capture the redistributive tastes of the government by social marginal welfare weights
across diﬀerent couples. We denote by gl(n) the (average) social marginal welfare weight for
couples with primary-earner ability n and secondary-earner participation l.F o r m a l l y ,w eh a v e
g0(n)=Ψ0(V0(n))/λ and g1(n)=
R ¯ q
0 Ψ0(V1(n) − q)p(q|n)dq/(P(¯ q|n) · λ). The proﬁle for these
g-weights in the population is crucial for the properties of optimal tax schedules.
Figure 1 illustrates curves for g0 (n) and g1 (n) satisfying four ‘natural’ properties. First,
because of our assumption of no income eﬀects, the average of g0 and g1 across the full population
is one.13 Second, the concavity of Ψ tend to make g0 and g1 decreasing in n.14 Third, we have
g0(n)−g1(n) > 0 because, at a given n, one-earner couples are worse oﬀ than two-earner couples
and Ψ is concave. To see why one-earner couples are worse oﬀ (at a given n), notice that the
reason for second-earner non-participation is a high work cost q. More precisely, the utility of
any one-earner couple is V0 (n), and this must be lower than the utility of a two-earner couple,
V1 (n) − q, given that this couple has decided to let the spouse work (from eq. 6).15 Fourth,
the diﬀerence in weights g0 − g1 is naturally decreasing in n as the contribution of secondary
earnings becomes relatively smaller as n becomes larger. As we shall see below, this property is
closely related to Ψ0 being convex. In the limit when n goes to inﬁnity, we would expect g0 −g1
to converge to zero.
2.3 The Optimal Income Tax Schedule and its Properties
2.3.1 Explicit Tax Formulas and their relation to Mirrlees (1971)
T h es i m p l em o d e ld e s c r i b e da b o v em a k e si tp o s s i b l et od e r i v ee x p l i c i to p t i m a lt a xf o r m u l a sa s
in the individualistic Mirrlees (1971) framework. In appendix A.1, we show that the optimal
tax scheme satisﬁes the following.
13Because of no income eﬀects, it costs exactly $1 to redistribute $1 uniformly across all couples. The social
marginal value (expressed in terms of government funds) of redistributing $1 to every couple is exactly the sum
of the g’s across the full population.
14As V0(n) is increasing in n, g0(n) is obviously decreasing in n. As we will see, g1(n) will in general be
decreasing in n as well.
15Conceivably, we may alternatively have deﬁned q as the value of home production–say, the spouse’s ability
in cooking or child care–by adding q in the utility function such that u = z+w·l−T −n·h(z/n)+q·(1−l).T h e
work decision would be identical in this model, but one-earner couples would be better oﬀ than two-earner couples
and hence g0 − g1 < 0. It is easy to show that our negative jointness result would become a positive jointness
result in this context. However, we believe that inequality in work opportunities is much more important than
inequality in home production abilities.
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0 (non working spouse)
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1 (working spouse)Proposition 1 The ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal marginal tax rates T0
0 and T0
1 at ability













































where all the terms outside the integrals are evaluated at ability level n and all the terms inside the
integrals are evaluated at n0. These conditions apply at any point n where there is no bunching,
i.e., where zl(n) is strictly increasing in n. If the conditions generate segments over which z0(n)
or z1(n) a r ed e c r e a s i n g ,t h e nt h e r ei sb u n c h i n ga n dz0(n) or z1(n) are constant over a segment.
Kleven et al. (2006) presents a detailed discussion of the relation between these tax formulas
and classic Mirrlees-type formulas. At the present moment, let us remark on just two aspects.
First, the average marginal tax rate faced by primary earners in one- and two-earner couples
is identical to the optimal marginal tax rate in the Mirrlees framework. By taking the sum
of (10) and (11), we obtain a weighted average of T0
0 and T0
1 which is exactly identical to the
Mirrlees formula in the case with no income eﬀects (as in Diamond, 1998). This implies that
redistribution across couples with diﬀerent primary earners follows the standard logic in the
literature. The role of introducing a secondary earner in the household is to create a potential
diﬀerence in the marginal tax rates faced by primary earners with working and non-working
spouses, which we explore in detail below.
Second, the famous results that optimal marginal tax rates are zero at the bottom and the
top carry over to the couple model, and follow directly from the transversality conditions (see
Appendix A.1). As is well-known, these results have limited practical relevance, because the
bottom result does not apply when there is an atom of non-workers, and because the top-rate
drops to zero only for the single top earner in empirical earnings distributions (Saez, 2001).
2.3.2 Asymptotic Properties of the Optimal Schedule
Suppose that the ability distribution of primary earners f (n) has an inﬁnite tail so that ¯ n = ∞.
Since top tails of income distributions are well approximated by Pareto distributions, we assume
that f(n) has a Pareto tail with parameter a>1.
As n tends to inﬁnity, the additional income generated by the secondary earner becomes
inﬁnitesimal relative to primary-earner income in the limit. For any reasonable welfare function,
9we would then have that g0(n) and g1(n) converge to the same value g∞.16 It is also natural
to assume that primary-earner elasticities ε0 and ε1 converge to ε∞, and that the distribution
of ﬁxed work costs P(q|n) converges to a distribution P∞(q).W ec a nt h e np r o v et h ef o l l o w i n g
result:
Proposition 2 Suppose T1−T0, T0
0, T0
1, ¯ q, τ converge to ∆T∞, T0∞
0 , T0∞
1 , ¯ q∞, τ∞ as n →∞ .
Then we have
• ∆T∞ = τ∞ =0 , i.e., the second-earner tax rate goes to zero as n tends to inﬁnity.
• T0∞
0 = T0∞
1 =( 1− g∞)/(1 − g∞ + a · ε∞) > 0, exactly as in the Mirrlees model.
Proof:
Because T1 − T0 converges as n goes to inﬁnity, it must be the case that T0∞
0 = T0∞
1 = T0∞.
Because ¯ q converges, we have that P(¯ q) and p(¯ q) also converge, and we denote their limits by
P∞ and p∞. The Pareto assumption implies that (1−F(n))/(nf(n)) = 1/a for large n.T a k i n g
the limit of (10) and (11) as n →∞ ,w eo b t a i n
T0∞























For this to be satisﬁed, we must have ∆T∞ =0 ,a n dt h ef o r m u l af o rT0∞ then follows. ¤
The result in Proposition 2 is quite striking. The earnings of spouses to the highest-income
earners should be exempted from taxation, even in the case where the government tries to
extract as much tax revenue as possible from high-income couples (g∞ =0 ). Although the
result may seem similar to the classic result of no distortion at the top, the logic behind our
result is completely diﬀerent. Indeed, in the present case with an inﬁnite tail for n, the traditional
result does not apply and we have T0∞
0 = T0∞
1 > 0.17
To understand the economic intuition for this result, consider a situation where T1−T0 does
not converge to zero. This is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows the two schedules T0, T1 as
a function of ability n, assuming that T1 − T0 converges to ∆T∞ > 0. W ew a n tt oe s t a b l i s h
a contradiction by arguing that, in this situation, it is always possible to increase welfare by
reducing T1 − T0 a little bit at the top. Consider speciﬁcally a reform which increases the tax
16In the case where g
∞ =0 , the optimal tax system extracts as much tax revenue as possible from the very
rich (‘soaking the rich’).
17Conversely, in the case of a bounded ability distribution, the top marginal tax rate on the primary earner
would be zero, but then the tax on the secondary earner would be positive.
10n+dn n















Abilityon one-earner couples and decreases the tax on two-earner couples above some high n,a n di n
such a way that the net mechanical eﬀect on government revenue is zero.18 These tax burden
changes are achieved by increasing the marginal tax rate for one-earner couples in a small band
(n,n + dn), and lowering the marginal tax rate for two-earner couples in this band.
What are the welfare eﬀects of the reform? First, there are direct welfare eﬀe c t sa st h e
reform redistribute income from one-earner couples (who lose dW0) to two-earner couples (who
gain dW1). However, because social marginal welfare weights for one- and two-earner couples
have converged to g∞, these direct welfare eﬀects cancel out. Second, there are ﬁscal eﬀects due
to earnings responses of primary earners in the small band where marginal tax rates have been
changed (dH0 and dH1). Because T1−T0 have converged to a constant for large n,t h em a r g i n a l
tax rates on one- and two-earner couples are identical, T0∞
0 = T0∞
1 , which implies z0 = z1 and
hence identical primary-earner elasticities ε0 = ε1. As a consequence, the negative ﬁscal eﬀect
dH0 oﬀsets the positive ﬁscal eﬀect dH1. Third, there is a participation eﬀect as some secondary
earners are induced to join the labor force since the extra tax on two-earner families has been
reduced. Because T1 − T0 is initially positive, this response will generate a positive ﬁscal eﬀect,
dP > 0. Since all other eﬀects were zero, dP > 0 is the net total welfare eﬀect of the reform.
Since the reform increases welfare, the original schedule with ∆T∞ > 0 cannot be optimal.19
2.3.3 Desirability of Negative Jointness
A key point of this paper is to demonstrate that optimal schedules are characterized by negative
jointness. To show this, we introduce two additional assumptions.
Assumption 1 The function V −→ Ψ0(V ) is convex.
This is a very natural assumption on social preferences which is satisﬁed for all standard social
welfare functions such as the CRRA form, Ψ(V )=V 1−γ/(1 − γ) with γ>0,a n dt h eC A R A
form. As we show formally below, the assumption is directly related to the property that g0−g1
is decreasing in n which, as we discussed above, is intuitively appealing. Notice also that,
in the context of consumer theory, convexity of marginal utility of consumption is a common
assumption, since it captures the notion of prudence and generates precautionary savings (e.g.
Deaton, 1992).
18Because ¯ q and hence P(¯ q) have converged, revenue-neutrality requires that the tax changes on one- and
two-earner couples are dT0 = dT/(1 − P(¯ q)) and dT1 = −dT/P(¯ q), respectively.
19Of course, the opposite situation with ∆T
∞ < 0 cannot be optimal either, because then the opposite reform
would improve welfare.
11Assumption 2 q and n are independently distributed.
Abstracting from correlation in spouse characteristics (assortative matching) allows us to isolate
the implications for the optimal tax system of the interaction between spouses occurring through
the social welfare function. Obviously, we do not expect this assumption to hold in practice and
in Section 2.4 we examine numerically how assortative matching aﬀects our results.
The most transparent way to demonstrate the desirability of negative jointness is by a tax
reform argument starting from the optimal separable tax system. Under separable tax treatment,
the primary-earner marginal tax rate is identical in one- and two-earner couples, T0
0 = T0
1 ≡ T0,
and it is straightforward to show that T0 is given by the standard Mirrlees formula with no
income eﬀects (as in Diamond, 1998). Moreover, separable tax treatment implies that T1 − T0
is constant in n, and its value can be obtained by shifting the T1-a n dT0-schedules uniformly
by dT.F o rt h eT1-schedule, this generates the formula







and for the T0-schedule, we obtain
(T1 − T0) ·
p(¯ q)





Summing these two equations implies
(T1 − T0) ·
p(¯ q)




[g0(n) − g1(n)]f(n)dn > 0, (12)
where the positive sign follows from the property g0 (n) − g1 (n) > 0 ∀n. As pointed out above,
this property derives from the fact that one-earner couples are worse oﬀ than two-earner couples
at any n along with Ψ being concave. Hence, the optimal separable tax schedule involves
T1 − T0 > 0. Any separable tax system also satisﬁes the following important property.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and with a separable tax system, g0(n)−g1(n) is (weakly)
decreasing in n.
Proof:
Because the tax system is separable, we have that ¯ q = w−(T1 −T0) is constant in n.M o r e o v e r ,
by Assumption 2, we also have that p(q|n)=p(q) and P(¯ q|n)=P(¯ q) are constant in n. Then,









0 Ψ00(V0 +¯ q − q)p(q)dq
λ · P(¯ q)
#
· ˙ V0,
12w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dV1 = V0 +¯ q from eq. (6). By Assumption 1, Ψ00 is increasing and hence the
expression in square brackets is negative. Moreover, V0 is increasing in n, which demonstrates
the Lemma. ¤
Starting from the optimal separable tax schedule, consider a tax reform introducing a little
bit of negative jointness as shown in Figure 3. The tax reform has two components. Above
ability level n, we increase the tax on one-earner couples and decrease the tax on two-earner
couples. Below ability level n, we decrease the tax on one-earner couples and increase the tax on
two-earner couples. As shown the ﬁgure, these tax burden changes are associated with changes
in the marginal tax rates on primary earners around n.
To ensure that the reform is revenue-neutral (absent any behavioral responses), let the size
of the tax change on each segment be inversely proportional to the number of couples on the
segment. This implies that, above n, the tax change for one-earner couples is dTa
0 = dT/[(1 −
F(n))(1 − P(¯ q))], while the tax change for two-earner couples is dTa
1 = −dT/[(1 − F(n))P(¯ q)].
Below n, the tax change for one-earner couples is dTb
0 = dT/[F(n)(1−P(¯ q))] and the tax change
for two-earner couples is dTb
1 = dT/[F(n)P(¯ q)]. These changes imply that the direct welfare













[g0(n0) − g1(n0)]f(n0)dn0. (13)
Lemma 2 implies that dW > 0. That is, the gain created at the bottom by redistributing from
two-earner to one-earner couples (the ﬁrst term in 13) dominates the loss created at the top
from the opposite redistribution (the second term in 13), because g0−g1 is higher at the bottom
as second-earner participation is relatively more important in low-income families.
Besides the direct welfare eﬀect, the tax reform gives rise to behavioral responses along the
intensive and extensive margins. First, since the reform increases (reduces) the marginal tax rate
on the primary earner in one-earner (two-earner) couples around n, there are earnings responses
going in opposite directions in the two types of couples. Since we start from a situation with
separable taxation, T0
0 = T0
1, we have identical primary-earner elasticities ε0 = ε1.T h i si m p l i e s
that the ﬁscal eﬀect of these intensive responses oﬀset one another exactly.
Second, the tax reform induces some secondary earners to change labor force participation
status. Above n, non-working spouses will be induced to join the labor force, whereas below
n, working spouses have an incentive to drop out. Because spouse characteristics q and n are
independent, and because we start from a separable tax system, the participation elasticity is
constant in n (from eq. 7) and the positive and negative participation eﬀects then cancel out.
13n+dn n-dn n
{
T- T >0 10
Tax paid
Ability







ReformTo see this more formally, note that the number of switchers above n is (1 − F(n))p(¯ q)d¯ qa
where d¯ qa = dTa
0 − dTa
1 = dT/[(1 − F(n))P (¯ q)(1− P (¯ q))]. Symmetrically, the number of
switchers below n is F(n)p(¯ q)d¯ qb where d¯ qb = dTb
0 − dTb
1 = −dT/[F(n)P (¯ q)(1− P (¯ q))].S i n c e
the positive and negative participation eﬀects have the same magnitude, and because T1 −T0 is
initially constant in n, the net ﬁscal eﬀect of participation responses is zero.
We can then conclude that dW > 0 is the net total welfare eﬀect of the reform, allowing us
to state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, and starting from the optimal separable schedule,
introducing some negative jointness always increases welfare.
This tax-reform result represents a ﬁrst step in establishing that negative jointness is a
feature of fully optimized schedules. In Kleven et al. (2006), we show formally that, under
additional regularity assumptions on the functions h(.) and P(.), the optimum schedule does
indeed display negative jointness everywhere, i.e., T0
0 >T0
1 ∀n and τ is decreasing in n.W eo m i t
the formal proof here because it does not provide any additional economic insight, and because
the proof in the double continuous model in Section 3 is mathematically more elegant.
Although our results may seem surprising at ﬁrst glance, they obey a simple redistributive
logic. The government wants to support one-earner families because they are less well-oﬀ than
two-earner families. If the tax schedule for two-earner couples is seen as the base schedule, the
schedule for one-earner couples is obtained from this base by giving a tax break for having a
dependent spouse. Because the importance of second-earner participation declines with primary
earnings, the dependent spouse tax allowance should be declining in primary earnings. In the
limit where primary earnings go to inﬁnity, the allowance converges to zero.
2.4 Numerical Simulations
We make the following simple parametric assumptions. First, we assume that h(x)=x1+k/(1+
k), so that we have a constant primary earner elasticity ε =1 /k. Second, we assume that
F(n) is distributed over [n, ¯ n] as a truncated Pareto distribution with parameter a>1.T h i r d ,
we assume that q is distributed as a power function on the interval [0,q max] with distribution
function P(q)=( q/qmax)η and density function p(q)=η · (qη−1)/q
η
max so that the elasticity
of participation with respect to net gain of working is constant and equal to η.F o u r t h , w e
assume that the social welfare function Ψ is CRRA with coeﬃcient of risk aversion γ>0, i.e.,
Ψ(V )=V 1−γ/(1−γ).W es e tn =1 , ¯ n =4 , w =1 , qmax =2·w,a n da =2 . For our benchmark
14case, we assume γ =2 , ε =0 .5, η =0 .5. In all cases, we check that the implementation
conditions (zl(n) increasing in n)a r es a t i s ﬁed. Details about our simulations are presented in
Appendix A.7.
Figure 4 plots the optimal T0
0, T0
1,a n dτ as a function of n. Consistent with our theoretical
results, we have T0
0 = T0
1 =0at the end points and T0
1 <T 0
0 everywhere else. The diﬀerence
between T0
1 and T0
0 is about 7 percentage points which makes T0
0 about 30% percent larger than
T0
1. The graph also shows that the tax on secondary earners τ is decreasing in n from about
37 percent at n to 22 percent at ¯ n. This suggests that the negative jointness property is not
a negligible phenomenon and that it generates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in marginal tax rates
between one- and two-earner couples.
Figure 5 examines the sensitivity of optimal tax rates with respect to alternative parameter
values. It shows optimal tax rates T0
0, T0
1,a n dτ in four situations. In Panel A, we increase the
participation elasticity η to one. We ﬁnd that this decreases the level of the tax on secondary
earners by about 10 percentage points but the decreasing slope for τ (or, equivalently, the gap
between T0
0 and T0
1)r e m a i n ss i g n i ﬁcant and fairly close to the benchmark case. In Panel B,
we increase the intensive elasticity ε to one. We ﬁnd that this decreases the level of marginal
tax rates on primary earners by about 10 percentage points but again the decreasing slope for
τ (and the gap between T0
0 and T0
1) remains signiﬁcant as a proportion of tax rate levels. In
panel C, we increase both η and ε to one. This reduces T0
0, T0
1,a n dτ but the negative jointness
pattern remains. Taken together, results from Panels A, B, C show that levels of tax rates
obey the traditional Ramsey principle: when the elasticity increases, the corresponding tax rate
decreases. In Panel D, we increase redistributive tastes of the government to γ =4 .W e ﬁnd
that all tax rates increase signiﬁcantly but, again, the negative jointness pattern remains about
the same in proportion to tax rates.
Figure 6 explores two other departures from our benchmark case. Panel A focuses on the
Rawlsian case (γ = ∞). In this case, we have that g1(n)=0and that g0(n) is a Dirac distribution
with all mass concentrated at n. The optimal tax formulas from Proposition 1 continue to apply
but the transversality condition T0
0 =0is no longer true at the bottom. Indeed, the simulation
shows that T0
0(n)=5 9 %in this case. Interestingly, the negative jointness result carries over to
this case. The Rawlsian case is theoretically interesting because it is formally equivalent to a
multi-product nonlinear pricing problem as analyzed in the Industrial Organization literature.
This shows that the negative jointness result would carry over in that case as well.
Figure 6, Panel B, explores the case with a long tail. In the simulation, we set ¯ n =2 0 0

























































































































































































τ(which is a close approximation to an inﬁnite tail). The ﬁgure shows that in this case, T0
0 and
T0
1 converge to the theoretical asymptotic value of 1/(1 + a · ε)=1 /2.W e a l s o s e e t h a t , a s
expected, τ converges to zero.
Figure 7 examines the implications of introducing positive or negative correlation in spouse
characteristics, n and q. If we think of a low q as reﬂecting a high ability of the secondary earner,
a negative correlation in n and q would correspond to a positive correlation in ability, and vice
versa. We introduce correlation by making qmax a function of n; it will be a decreasing function
in the case of positive ability correlation and an increasing function in the case of negative ability
correlation. The correlations are calibrated so that the average participation rates of spouses
remains approximately the same. Panel C displays the participation rates of spouses by potential
earnings in the cases of independent abilities (benchmark), positive correlation in ability, and
negative correlation in ability. Panel C shows that we have introduced signiﬁcant correlation
with participation rates doubling from n to ¯ n in the positive correlation case and decreasing by
50% from n to ¯ n in the negative correlation case. Panels A and B display the optimal tax rates
in the positive and negative correlation case, respectively. The levels of tax rates are higher
in the positive correlation case because inequality is more important in that case and hence
redistribution more desirable. However, the negative jointness pattern is very similar to the
cases with no correlation. This suggests that the empirical observation of positive correlation
in ability across spouses (positive assortative mating) would not overturn the negative jointness
result we have obtained.
3 A Continuous Labor Supply Choice for the Secondary Earner
3.1 Model and Optimal Tax Formulas
In this Section, we model primary and secondary earners symmetrically. There is a distribution
of earnings abilities (np,n s) over the population of couples with density f(np,n s) on the domain
D =( np, ¯ np) × (ns, ¯ ns).20 We deﬁne fp(np)=
R ¯ ns
ns f(np,n s)dns as the unconditional density
distribution of np,a n dfs(ns) symmetrically as the unconditional density distribution of ns.W e
then deﬁne fp|s(np|ns)=f(np,n s)/fs(ns) as the density distribution of np conditional on ns,
and fs|p(ns|np)=f(np,n s)/fp(np) as the density distribution of ns conditional on np.
The utility function is given by
u(c,zp,z s)=c − nphp(zp/np) − nshs(zs/ns),
20We assume that D is open and we denote by ¯ D the closure of D.






































































































The indirect utility function is denoted by V (np,n s),a n di t sﬁrst-order derivatives with respect
to np and ns are given by (using the envelope theorem):
∂pV = −hp +( zp/np)h0
p and ∂sV = −hs +( zs/ns)h0
s. (15)




Ψ(V (np,n s))f (np,n s)dnpdns,
subject to a government budget constraint
ZZ
D
T (zp,z s)f (np,n s)dnpdns ≥ E,
and subject to the conditions for couple utility maximization in (15).
This is a continuous two-dimensional screening problem. There is a small literature in
optimal tax theory considering this type of multi-dimensional screening models originating with
Mirrlees (1976, 1986). There is a larger literature on multi-dimensional screening problems in
nonlinear pricing theory (see McAﬀee and McMillan, 1988; Wilson, 1993; Armstrong, 1996;
Armstrong 1999; Rochet and Choné, 1998; and Rochet and Stole, 2002). We explain the link to
this literature in Section 3.4.
We can state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal marginal tax rates T0
p and T0
s at ability























where tp and ts are multipliers satisfying the transversality conditions tp(np,n s)=tp(¯ np,n s)=0






· fp(np)=[ g(np,n s) − 1] · f(np,n s), (18)
where g(np,n s)=Ψ0(V (np,n s))/λ is the marginal welfare weight for couples with ability (np,n s).
17The proof is presented in Appendix A.2.
The formulas are obtained from the ﬁrst-order conditions to the Hamiltonian. The divergence
equation (18) has many solutions satisfying the boundary transversality conditions. The fact
that the second-order derivative of the indirect utility function V (np,n s) has to be symmetric,
gives an additional condition making the optimum solution unique generically. In addition, the
global individual maximization conditions need to be satisﬁed. If those conditions fail, then
there is bunching and the ﬁrst-order conditions from the proposition break down. We come
back to this important issue in detail in Section 3.4. In Sections 3.1-3, we always assume that
those conditions are met and hence that there is no bunching.
It is easy to show that the average T0
p across ns is the same as in the individualistic Mirrlees




p as the cumulated unconditional distribution
of np.W et h e nd e ﬁne Gp(np) as the average of marginal welfare weights g(n0
p,n 0
s) above np:






















(1 − Fp(np)) · (1 − Gp(np)) + δp(np,n s)
npfp(np)
, (19)
where δp(np,n s) averages to zero when summed over ns, i.e., for all np
Z ¯ ns
ns
δp(np,n s)f(np,n s)dns =0 .
The symmetric equations hold when substituting p for s.
Proof:
δp(np,n s) is deﬁned as:





− (1 − Fp) · (1 − Gp).
Hence, equation (16) implies:
δp(np,n s) · f(np,n s)=tp · fp · fs − (1 − Fp) · (1 − Gp) · f(np,n s).
Integrating this expression over (ns, ¯ ns),w eh a v e :
Z ¯ ns
ns
δp(np,n s)f(np,n s)dns = fp(np)
Z ¯ ns
ns
tp(np,n s)fs(ns)dns −fp(np)·(1−Fp)·(1−Gp). (20)
18Integrating the divergence equation (18) over ns and using the transversality conditions, we







[g(np,n s) − 1] · f(np,n s)dns,








[1 − g(np,n s)] · f(np,n s)dns =( 1− Gp(np)) · (1 − Fp(np)).
This implies that the expression (20) is zero which completes the proof. ¤
3.2 Asymptotic Properties of the Optimal Schedule
Suppose that the ability distribution of primary earners has an inﬁnite tail, ¯ np = ∞.L e t u s
assume that f(np,n s)=fp(np)fs(ns) and that, for np large, fp(np) is the density of a Pareto
distribution with parameter a>1.
As np tends to inﬁnity, the additional income generated by the secondary earner becomes
inﬁnitesimal relative to primary-earner income in the limit. For any reasonable welfare function,
we would then have that g(np,n s) converge to the same value g∞ for all ns. It is also natural
to assume that elasticities εi converge to ε∞
i when np →∞for i = p,s.W ec a nt h e np r o v et h e
following result:
Proposition 6 If T0
p (z (np,n s)) converges to τ∞
p (ns) and T0
s (z (np,n s)) converges to τ∞
s (ns) as
np →∞(and assuming that the limits are bounded from below uniformly in ns), then we have:
• τ∞
s (ns)=0for all ns.
• τ∞
p (ns)=( 1− g∞)/
¡





We ﬁrst establish that τ∞
p (ns) is constant in ns. By contradiction, suppose that there are
n1
s,n 2




s).U s i n g∂pV = −hp(zp/np)+(zp/np)h0
p(zp/np) which is increasing
in zp/np and hence in 1−T0
p from (14), we have ∂pV (np,n 2
s)−∂pV (np,n 1
s) → δ>0 when np →∞ .
That implies that V (np,n 2
s) − V (np,n 1
s) → +∞ when np →∞ . However, ∂sV (np,n s)=
−hs(zs/ns)+( zs/ns)h0
s(zs/ns) converges to a ﬁnite limit for any ns uniformly bounded in ns
(because T0






s ∂sV (np,n 0
s)dn0
s converges to a ﬁnite limit when np →∞which is a contradiction. Let us
now denote τ∞
p the uniform limit of T0
p.
19Integrating the divergence equation (18) over the NE quadrant (np,∞)×(ns, ¯ ns), and using






























p ) for any n0
s.T h eﬁrst-order condition (17) imply that ts(np,n s)
converges to t∞
s (ns)=nsfs(ns) · ε∞
s · τ∞
s (ns)/(1 − τ∞
s (ns)). Dividing (21) by 1 − Fp(np) and



















The transversality condition implies that t∞
s (ns)=0so that the second term on the left-hand-
side of (22) vanishes when ns = ns. This establishes the second bullet of the lemma. Equation
(22) then implies that t∞
s (ns)=0for any ns and hence τ∞
s (ns)=0for any ns which proves the
ﬁrst bullet of the lemma. ¤
This proposition shows that the no tax on spouses at the top result generalizes to the double-
continuous model. The intuition is the same as in the binary case.21
3.3 Desirability of Negative Jointness
Suppose the government implements the optimal separable tax schedule. It is then straightfor-



















(1 − Fs(ns)) · (1 − Gs(ns))
nsfs
. (24)
Let us introduce the equivalent of Assumption 2 in the current model:
Assumption 2’: np and ns are independently distributed.
Now, as in the binary case, it is possible to show that under Assumptions 1 (Ψ0 convex) and
Assumption 2’, and starting from the optimal separable schedule characterized above, a tax
21If both distributions of np and ns have an inﬁnite tail with the same Pareto parameter and the same asymptotic
elasticity of labor supply ε
∞, then, along the diagonal np = ns, both marginal tax rates should be equal and
converge to (1 − g
∞)/(1 − g
∞ +2· a · ε
∞) when np = ns tend to inﬁnity.
20reform introducing a little bit of negative jointness increases welfare. The proof is given in
Kleven et al. (2006), but we omit it here and focus instead on the properties of optimal schemes.
Of course, the result that it is welfare improving to introduce a little bit of negative jointness
establishes a strong intuition that negative jointness is a feature of optimal incentive schemes.22
Indeed, we can show:
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 2’ and assuming that the optimal tax system is smooth and
displays no bunching, we have:








≤ 0, and T00
ps ≤ 0. (25)
• If Ψ0 is concave, the optimal tax scheme features positive jointness everywhere.
• If Ψ0 is linear, the optimal tax scheme is separable and the optimal tax rates are given by
equations (23) and (24).
Proof:
The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let us consider the case where Ψ0 is convex. We deﬁne as
C the subset of D where property (25) is not met.
First, we note that eq. (14) and the fact that the functions hp and hs are convex imply
that the signs of ∂T0
p/∂ns and ∂zp/∂ns are opposite (such that one is positive/zero/negative iﬀ
the other is negative/zero/positive). Similarly, the signs of ∂T0
s/∂np and ∂zs/∂np are opposite.
Second, from eq. (15) we obtain ∂2
psV =( zp/n2
p)·h00




and the symmetry condition ∂2
psV = ∂2
spV then implies that the signs of ∂zs/∂np and ∂zp/∂ns
are identical. Hence, the ﬁrst two inequalities in (25) are equivalent.
Assumption 2’ implies that fp|s(np|ns)=fp(np) and fs|p(ns|np)=fs(ns). Hence, the optimal























22The proof of the desirability of introducing negative jointness requires to assume no bunching. The analysis
of bunching in the optimal separable tax system is the same as in the one dimensional Mirrlees (1971) model.
Therefore, there will be no bunching in a wide set of cases as in the Mirrlees (1971).
21We show in Appendix A.3 that the second order condition of the government maximization
program imply that x → (1−h0
p(x))/(xh00
p(x)) is decreasing at any point x = zp(n)/np for n ∈ D.
Therefore, diﬀerentiating (26) with respect to ns,w eh a v et h a t∂tp/∂ns has the opposite sign of
∂zp/∂ns and hence the same sign as ∂T0
p/∂ns. Similarly, ∂ts/∂np has the same sign as ∂T0
s/∂np.
W ec a nt h e nd e ﬁne our contradiction set C as follows:
C = {(np,n s) ∈ D|∂ts/∂np > 0} = {(np,n s) ∈ D|∂tp/∂ns > 0}.
C is an open set (because ∂ts/∂np and ∂tp/∂ns are continuous functions by assumption). We
denote by ∂C the boundary of C. Again, by continuity of ∂ts/∂np,w eh a v e∂ts/∂np = ∂tp/∂ns =
0 for any (np,n s) ∈ ∂C.W ed e n o t eb yCc the complement of C in D.
Lemma 3 If Ψ0 is convex then, for any (np,n s) ∈ C, we have ∂2g/(∂np∂ns) > 0.
By deﬁnition, g(np,n s)=Ψ0(V (np,n s))/λ where λ>0 is the multiplier of the government
budget constraint. Hence, λ · ∂g/∂np = Ψ00(V ) · ∂pV and λ · ∂2g/(∂np∂ns)=Ψ000(V ) · ∂pV ·
∂sV + Ψ00(V ) · ∂2
psV .T h e ﬁrst term in this expression is positive because Ψ0 is convex and
∂pV,∂sV> 0. In the second term, we have ∂2
psV =( zp/n2
p)·h00
p ·∂zp/∂ns.B yd e ﬁnition of C,w e
have ∂zp/∂ns < 0 and hence ∂2
psV< 0. Hence, since Ψ is concave such that Ψ00 < 0, the second
term is also positive, and the lemma is then established.
The property ∂2g/(∂np∂ns) > 0 captures the notion that the diﬀerence in social marginal
welfare weights between families with low- and high-ability primary earners decreases when
secondary-earner ability increases. This property is directly equivalent to Ψ000 > 0 when the tax
system is separable (in which case ∂2
psV =0 ) . T h el e m m as h o w st h a ti th o l d sa - f o r t i o r iw h e n
the tax system displays positive jointness.




































































This allows us to apply the Divergence Theorem relating the area integral of the divergence of


















K · dm, (31)
where m is the unit vector outward normal to C on ∂C. Figure 8 displays an illustration in
the case of a region C with no holes with a simple curve ∂C.23 Lemma 3 establishes that the
left-hand side of (31) is positive. We are now going to show that K · m ≤ 0 on ∂C to establish
a contradiction.
Lemma 4 For any (np,n s) ∈ ∂C, we have K · m ≤ 0.
The proof of this Lemma is illustrated in Figure 8. We have ∂tp/∂ns > 0 inside C and ∂tp/∂ns ≤
0 outside C. Hence, ∂tp/∂ns increases as one goes from outside C to inside C along a horizontal
line (constant ns and changing np)a ss h o w ni nt h eﬁgure. Consider the two points where this
horizontal line intersects the boundary ∂C.I f a r e a C is on the right side of the intersection
point, then we have that ∂tp/∂ns is increasing in np and hence ∂2tp/(∂np∂ns) ≥ 0 at the
intersection point. Area C is on the right side of the intersection point if and only if mp,d e ﬁned
as the p component of vector m,i sn e g a t i v e . 24 Conversely, if area C i so nt h el e f ts i d eo ft h e
intersection point, then we have ∂2tp/(∂np∂ns) ≤ 0 and mp > 0.B y d e ﬁnition of Kp,t h i s
means that Kp · mp ≤ 0 in all cases. In a similar way, we can show that Ks · ms ≤ 0 by using
that ∂ts/∂np increases as one goes from outside C to inside C along a vertical line (constant
np and changing ns). If area C is above the intersection point of this vertical line with ∂C,
it means that ∂2tp/(∂np∂ns) ≥ 0 at ∂C.A r e a C being above the intersection point means
that ms < 0, and we then have Ks · ms ≤ 0.W h e n a r e a C is instead below the intersection
point, we have ∂2tp/(∂np∂ns) ≤ 0, ms > 0, and then again Ks · ms ≤ 0.H e n c e , w e h a v e
K · m = Kp · mp + Ks · ms ≤ 0 and the lemma is established.
Finally, we need to show that ∂ts/∂np ≤ 0 and ∂tp/∂ns ≤ 0 implies T00
ps ≤ 0 such that the
direct tax function T(zp,z s) has a negative cross-derivative on the image domain of the solution.
23The divergence theorem is valid for a region with holes. In that case the boundary integral is the sum of all
the simple boundary integrals along all the simple closed curves deﬁning the boundary ∂C. Note that the curves
in ∂C always close because the region C cannot intersect with the boundary ∂D of the domain D. This is because
the transversality conditions imply that ∂ts/∂np = ∂tp/∂ns =0on ∂D.
24Remember m is pointing outward from C.
23m m
C
T’’ > 0 ps
T’’ < 0 ps
T’’ < 0 ps T’’ < 0
ps
























































Figure 8. Proof of Lemma 4The proof follows from manipulation of the ﬁrst-order and second-order conditions from the
individual maximization problem and is presented in Appendix A.4.
The proof in the case Ψ0 concave follows exactly the same path by deﬁning a symmetric
contradictory set. In that case, Lemmas 3 and 4 also apply in the contradictory set but with op-
posite signs. Finally, the case where Ψ0 is linear can be demonstrated by showing that equations
(23) and (24) deﬁne an optimum that satisﬁes all the equations from Proposition 4. ¤
3.4 Bunching and Link with Multi-Dimensional Screening
Our main result Theorem 1 has been demonstrated assuming that the optimal tax system has no
bunching. Yet, the important studies by Armstrong (1996) and Rochet and Choné (1998) have
demonstrated that bunching is generic in multi-dimensional screening problems. Armstrong
(1996) made the important point that bunching happens generically at the bottom. Rochet
and Choné (1998) then characterized with great detail the complex nature of bunching. As
they explain, bunching arises from a conﬂict between participation constraints and second order
incentive compatibility conditions. However, in the case of social welfare maximization, there
are no participation constraints.
Theoretically, we can show that for moderate redistributive tastes, the solution displays no
bunching. The argument is the following: when Ψ(V )=V , the government has no concerns
for redistribution and hence the optimal system is the laissez-faire situation with no taxation
T0 = T1 ≡ 0. Obviously, the laissez-faire optimum displays no bunching. If we introduce a
little bit of taste for redistribution, the optimal solution should remain close to the laissez-
faire solution, implying that there should be no bunching for low levels of redistribution. This
argument amounts to proving that the optimal solution varies smoothly with the redistributive
tastes of the government.
In order to make a formal argument, we will make a number of parametric and regularity
assumptions in order to keep the mathematical proofs reasonably simple.25 First, we consider
t h eC R R Ac a s ew h e r eΨ0(V )=V −γ.T h ec a s eγ =0is the case with no redistribution concerns.
Second, we assume that hp(x)=hs(x)=x1+1/ε/(1 + 1/ε) so that the elasticities are constant
εp = εs = ε. In that case, equations (15) imply that ∂jV =( zj/nj)1+1/ε/(1 + ε) for j = p,s.
Third, we assume that f is C∞ and bounded away from zero on ¯ D. Finally, we assume that D
25We conjecture that the no bunching result can be generalized to a wider set of situations. We are particularly
indebted to Jean-Charles Rochet and David Lannes for helping us with the proof in the simple case we consider.
24is convex, bounded, and has a smooth (C∞) boundary.26
We start by ignoring the second order condition for the couples maximization. This is called
the relaxed problem in Rochet (1987) and Rochet and Choné (1998). As they do, we can then
























It is straightforward to show that the objective function is concave (and strictly so when γ>
0). Furthermore, the budget constraint B(V ) ≥ 0 deﬁnes a closed and convex set.28 Therefore,






D V (n)1−γf(n)dn is convex and continuous on K = {V ∈ H1(D) | 0 ≤
V ≤ N,0 ≤ ∂iV ≤ N,B(V ) ≥ 0} convex, closed, and bounded29 in the Sobolev (Hilbert) space
H1(D). A standard theorem in functional analysis ensures that a solution to problem (32)
exists.30 The strict convexity of K ensures that the solution is unique.31 Let us denote the
unique solution of (32) by V (γ). It is easy to show that V (γ =0 )=( np + ns)/(1 + ε) which
corresponds to the case with no redistributive tastes and no taxes where zi = ni for i = p,s.
Lemma 5 The solution V (γ) of the relaxed problem (32) is smooth in γ around γ =0so that
V (γ)=V (0)+γ·U +o(γ) where U ∈ C2( ¯ D) and o(γ)/γ → 0 when γ → 0 (in the norm C2( ¯ D)).
26In our previous subsection, we assumed that D was a rectangle which is not smooth at the corners. We need
to make a smoothness assumption in order to avoid the diﬃculties arising in elliptic problems in non-smooth
domains (see e.g., Grisvard (1985)).
27T h i sc a nb ed o n eb yr e p l a c i n gzj in the budget constraint by ∂jV =( zj/nj)
1+1/ε/(1 + ε).





i (x)) is decreasing for i = p,s. This condition is obviously met in the case of iso-elastic hi.
29The bounded property is obtained by imposing the additional constraints that ∂iV ≤ N where N is a large
and ﬁxed constant.
30The theorem states that a convex lower semi-continuous function attains a minimum on a closed convex and
bounded set of a reﬂexive Banach vector space (see e.g., Brezis (1983), Corollary III.19, p. 46). The Hilbert space
H
1(D) is obviously a reﬂexive Banach vector space.
31If V
1 and V
2 are two solutions, then V
∗ =( V
1 + V
2)/2 will be such that B(V




∗ +δ will be in K for δ small enough and will generate strictly higher social welfare than V
1 and V
2.
25We establish this lemma in Appendix A.5 where we show that U is the solution of a linear El-
liptic PDE. U characterizes the direction of the optimal tax distortion when small redistributive
tastes are introduced.
We now need to establish that the solution V (γ) displays no bunching for γ small. If
V ∈ K is solution of the relaxed problem (32), we can deﬁne zj(n) for j = p,s using ∂jV =
(zj/nj)1+1/ε/(1 + ε). We can then deﬁne c(n)=V (n)+nphp(zp(n)/np)+nshs(zs(n)/ns).T h e
direct utility function is deﬁned as u(c,z,n)=c − nphp(zp/np) − nshs(zs/ns).T h es o l u t i o nV
satisﬁes the global individual utility maximization if and only if V (n) ≥ u(c(n0),z(n0),n) for all
n,n0 ∈ D. In that case, the solution of the relaxed problem is actually the solution of the full
problem and be decentralized with a tax system.
Following Mirrlees (1976, 1986), we can establish the following lemma insuring that V (and
the implied z(n)) satisfy global utility maximization:
Lemma 6 If ∂zp/∂np ≥ 0, ∂zs/∂ns ≥ 0,a n d(∂zp/∂np)·(∂zs/∂ns) ≥ K ·(∂zp/∂ns)·(∂zs/∂np)











then the solution V satisﬁes global individual utility maximization: V (n) ≥ u(c(n0),z(n0),n) for
all n,n0 ∈ D.
The Lemma is proved in appendix A.6. The lemma condition is obviously satisﬁed when
γ =0as zp = np and zs = ns in that case. The second derivative of V (γ =0 )=( np+ns)/(1+ε)
is zero D2V (γ =0 )=0(as a two-by-two matrix), therefore, Lemma 5 implies that D2V (γ)=
γD2U + o(γ) → 0 when γ → 0.A s zi = ni((1 + ε)∂iV )ε/(1+ε) for i = p,s, the cross-partial
derivatives ∂zi/∂nj (for i 6= j) will be close to zero for small γ. Therefore, the condition of
lemma 6 for global utility maximization will be satisﬁed for small γ. Therefore, V (γ),t h e
solution of the relaxed problem is also the full solution. Hence, the full solution displays no
bunching for small γ. Therefore, we have proved the following:
Theorem 2 For γ close enough to zero, the optimal tax system displays no bunching.
There are four notable consequences of Theorem 2. First, this no bunching theorem for
small redistributive tastes also clearly applies to the standard Mirrlees (1971) one dimensional
problem. In contrast to the multi-dimensional case, it can be demonstrated using the ﬁrst order
condition for optimality and without invoking advanced functional analysis results. To the best
of our knowledge, this result does not seem to have been noticed in the extensive literature on
the one-dimensional problem.
26Second, it is easy to show that the multi-dimensional screening problem for the monopolist
is formally equivalent to our optimal tax problem in the case of a Rawlsian objective where the
government maximizes the utility of the worse-oﬀ couple (np,n s). In that case, it is equivalent
for the government to maximize taxes subject to a minimum utility level constraint and taxes
are then redistributed lump sum (as there are no income eﬀects). In that case, γ = ∞ and
the social marginal welfare weight g(np,n s) becomes a Dirac distribution with all mass at the
bottom point (np,n s). The bunching result from Armstrong (1996) clearly applies in that case
as well. This means that, as γ increases, we should expect bunching to appear. Exploring with
numerical simulations below how large γ needs to be for bunching to appear is left for future
research.
Third, we have shown in the previous subsection that when Ψ is quadratic, the optimal tax
system is separable. In that case, the cross derivatives ∂zi/∂nj,i 6= j are zero and therefore
∂zi/∂ni ≥ 0,i= p,s ensures that there is no bunching exactly as in the one dimensional case.
We know from the one dimensional case that this happens for a wide set of parameters. Starting
from Ψ quadratic, a small perturbation on Ψ will also create only a small deviation on the
solution V of the relaxed problem. As a result, the solution V will also display no bunching.
This shows that there should be a wide set of cases with signiﬁcant redistributive tastes where
the solution displays no bunching.
Finally, our no bunching result and the negative jointness result we derived in the previous
subsection carry over to the standard industrial organization model used in Armstrong (1996)
or Rochet and Choné (1998) if monopoly proﬁt maximization is replaced by social welfare
maximization as long as redistributive tastes are small enough. Social welfare maximization is of
less direct interest in Industrial Organization than in optimal taxation. However, it is interesting
to note that environments more competitive than monopoly pricing can also generate solutions
with no bunching in multi-dimensional pricing problems (see Armstrong and Vickers 2001 for a
recent analysis in that direction).
4M o d e l E x t e n s i o n s
4.1 Endogenous Marriage Decisions
We have demonstrated that negative jointness is optimal assuming that marriage is unresponsive
to taxes. Because any form of joint tax treatment for married couples aﬀects the incentives to
marry, it is relevant to consider the case of endogenous marriage. Indeed, a classic argument
27for individual taxation is that tax systems should be neutral with respect to marriage decisions.
Studies estimating the eﬀect of income taxes on marriage tend to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
but modest eﬀects (e.g. Alm and Whittington, 1999; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000).
We now present an argument that our results survive endogenous marriage in the context of
the binary model of Section 2 (the argument can easily be extended to the continuous model).
Suppose that the economy is populated by individuals of type p (characterized as our primary
earners by ability n)o rt y p es (characterized as our secondary earners by a ﬁxed work cost q),
and that individuals can choose either to be single or to be married. We start from the optimal
separable tax system so that marriage decisions are initially undistorted, and introduce a little
bit of negative jointness as illustrated in Figure 3. As described above, this reform creates a
positive direct welfare eﬀect, while the ﬁscal eﬀects from labor supply responses cancel out. In
the case of endogenous marriage, there is an additional behavioral response because incentives
to marry have changed. At low primary earnings, marriage has become less attractive for
two-earner couples and more attractive for one-earner couples while, at high primary earnings,
marriage incentives are changing in the opposite directions. However, the marriage responses
created these changes have no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on utility (standard envelope theorem) and no
ﬁrst-order eﬀect on government revenue, because we are starting from a separable tax schedule
whereby marital status has no tax consequences. Hence, the negative jointness reform is still
desirable and Proposition 3 remains valid. This implies that negative jointness should also be
part of an optimal incentive scheme, although the presence of marriage distortions will tend to
reduce the optimal degree of negative jointness.
4.2 The Collective Labor Supply Approach
A growing literature challenges the unitary approach adopted in this paper, arguing that the
family should be viewed as consisting of members with conﬂicting interests engaging in bargain-
ing over household resources (see Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, for a survey of this literature).
Empirical studies have supported this hypothesis. For example, the inﬂuential study of Lund-
berg et al. (1997) showed that a policy reform which transferred a child allowance from the
father to the mother signiﬁcantly increased spending on the wife and children in the family.
Following the seminal contributions by Chiappori (1988, 1992), the collective labor supply
model has become especially popular. This approach does not model a particular bargaining
process–only Pareto eﬃciency is assumed–and it encompasses the unitary model as a special
case. In the collective model, the within-family decision process amounts to maximizing a
28weighted sum of individual utilities, where the weights may depend on factors such as innate
characteristics, relative incomes, and on whom receives government transfers. It is natural to
distinguish between two cases depending on the government’s view on intra-family distribution.
In one case, policy makers respect family sovereignty. In this case, it is easy to see that changes
in intra-household distribution have no consequences for social welfare, implying that all our
optimal tax results continue to apply.
In the alternative case, policy makers disagree with intra-household distribution. The ﬁnd-
ings by Lundberg et al. (1997) suggest that the government can modify within-family consump-
tion allocation at no ﬁscal cost simply by transferring the beneﬁts from one spouse to the other
keeping total family income constant. As shown in the formal analysis of Kroft (2007), by
transferring enough resources across spouses, the government is able to restore a fair alloca-
tion within the family.32 Moreover, this within-family redistribution is not associated with an
eﬃciency loss, because it has no ﬁscal cost and because within-family bargaining is Pareto ef-
ﬁcient. Once within-family distributional issues are fully resolved at no eﬃciency cost, we are
essentially back to the problem of redistribution across families which we have analyzed in this
paper. Hence, the collective labor supply approach introduces a new intra-family dimension to
the redistribution problem which is very interesting and calls for more work, but which appears
to be independent of the inter-family redistribution problem considered in this paper.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper explored the optimal income tax treatment of couples allowing for fully general joint
income tax systems. To make progress on this diﬃcult problem, we focused on unitary models of
family decision making, and assumed no income eﬀects on labor supply and separability in the
disutility of work for husbands and wives. We considered models where the secondary earner’s
labor supply is either binary (only extensive response) or continuous (only intensive response).
Assuming independent abilities across spouses, our central theoretical result is that, if the social
marginal utility of income is convex in income, then the optimal tax function has a negative
cross-partial derivative everywhere, implying that the tax rate on one person is decreasing in
the earnings of the spouse. Numerical simulations showed that this negative jointness result
survives positive assortative matching and may even be reinforced.
The intuition for our results can be understood as follows. Redistribution from couples with
32For example, the credit reform studied in Lundberg et al. (1997) did not aﬀect family budget constraints but
yet had an impact on the consumption allocation within families.
29high primary earnings to couples with low primary earnings follows the logic of the Mirrlees
(1971) model. Indeed, the marginal tax rate on primary earners at each earnings level, averaging
over their diﬀerent spouses, is identical to the marginal tax rate obtained in the Mirrlees model.
At a given level of primary earnings, the government values redistribution from couples with high
secondary earnings to couples with low secondary earnings, and this requires a positive second-
earner tax. But the value of redistributing in favor of couples with low secondary earnings
diminishes as primary earnings increases, because secondary earnings become less important for
family utility. Hence, the optimal second-earner tax is decreasing in primary earnings, and tends
to zero as primary earnings go to inﬁnity.
The negative jointness result may seem surprising at ﬁrst glance, and at odds with the actual
practice in countries using joint taxation. However, we have argued that the current practice of
many European countries–such as the United Kingdom–combining an individual income tax
with a family-based and means-tested welfare system creates negative jointness. In families with
low primary-earner incomes, secondary earners face high tax rates due to transfer phase-out,
whereas in families with medium or high primary-earner incomes, secondary earners face low
tax rates because the income tax is individual.
It is interesting to note that our result, in the binary model, that the second-earner partici-
pation tax is always positive stands in contrast to Saez (2002) who showed that, for unmarried
individuals, the presence of participation responses tend to make EITC-schemes featuring neg-
ative tax rates at the bottom desirable. We conjecture a generalization of our model allowing
for participation responses for the primary earner would imply negative tax rates at the bottom
for primary earners along with positive tax rates on their spouses.
It would be very interesting to extend the numerical simulations to carefully calibrated
models which are closer to the real world in terms of labor supply responses and the joint
distribution of spouse abilities. Such simulations would allow us to assess the quantitative
importance of the negative jointness result and make it possible to assess quantitatively whether
the current practice in many OECD countries of imposing family based transfer programs along
with individually based income taxes is close to optimal. We leave such important extensions
for future work.
On the theoretical side, we have shown that with smooth and concave social welfare functions,
the solution of the multi-dimensional screening problem is regular with no bunching for a wide set
of parameters. This stands in sharp contrast to previous results in the Industrial Organization
literature showing that, in the case of monopoly proﬁt maximization, the solution displays
30bunching generically. With competitive environments instead of monopoly proﬁt maximization,
multi-dimensional screening problems can sometimes generate solutions with no bunching (see
e.g., Armstrong and Vickers (2001, 2006) and Armstrong (2006)). Using similar techniques as
the ones developed here, it might be possible to obtain qualitative properties of the optimal
solution in some of those cases. Finally, although our model has focused on the case of couples
taxation, it could be easily extended to other settings with multi-dimensional characteristics
where the separability assumptions we have made can be applied. An example could be health
and ability where health status is indirectly revealed by health expenditures while ability is
revealed by earnings. Such a model could possibly be used to analyze how individual health
care expenditures should be refunded by the government as a function of earnings.
31AA p p e n d i x























[z0(n) − nh(z0(n)/n) − V0(n)]p(q|n)f(n)dqdn ≥ 0,
and the constraints arising from the couples utility maximization: ˙ Vl(n)=−h(zl(n)/n)+
(zl(n)/n)h0(zl(n)/n) for l =0 ,1. Let us denote by λ, µ0(n), µ1(n), the multipliers associ-
ated. The transversality conditions are µ0(n)=µ1(n)=µ0(¯ n)=µ1(¯ n)=0 . We abbreviate
h(z1(n)/n) into h1, etc.




0 + λ · (1 − h0




1 + λ · (1 − h0
1) · P(¯ q|n) · f(n)=0 .








Ψ0(V1(n) − q)p(q|n)f(n)dq − λP(¯ q|n)f(n)+λ[T1 − T0]p(¯ q|n)f(n).
Using the social marginal welfare weights g0(n) and g1(n), we can integrate those two equations



















p)]P(¯ q|n0)f(n0) − [T1 − T0]p(¯ q|n0)f(n0)
ª
dn0.
Plugging these two equations into the ﬁrst order conditions for z0 and z1,n o t i n gt h a tT0
l =
1 − h0
l, and using the deﬁnition of the labor supply intensive elasticity (3), εl = h0
l/(h00
l · zl/n),
we obtain the expressions (10) and (11) in Proposition 1.
32The transversality conditions imply that T0
1 = T0
0 =0at the end points n and ¯ n.
Kleven et al. 2006 show that z0 and z1 weakly increasing in n is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for implementability (exactly as in the one dimensional Mirrlees model). If (10) and
(11) generate decreasing ranges for z0 or z1 then there is bunching and the formula do not apply
on the bunching portions.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4: Optimal Tax Formulas in the Continuous Model

























where λ is the scalar budget constraint multiplier and µp and µs are scalar functions of (np,n s).
To simplify the problem, it is useful to use the divergence theorem from multi-variable calculus

























and ds denotes the normal outward vector along ∂D, the boundary of D.







































V (µ · ds).
The transversality condition is that µ·ds =0on the boundary ∂D. In words, the scalar product
of the normal vector ds to the boundary of D and µ must be zero at all points along the boundary
∂D.I fD =[ np, ¯ np] × [ns, ¯ ns],t h e nµp =0for np = np, ¯ np and µs =0for ns = ns, ¯ ns.



























After routine rewriting and introducing the elasticity of earnings with respect to 1−T0
p,d e n o t e d






































Ψ0 (·) − λ
¤
f (np,n s). (37)
By deﬁning tp = µp/(λ · fs) and ts = µs/(λ · fp) and g (np,n s)=Ψ0 (·)/λ, we rewrite the
ﬁrst-order conditions above so as to obtain the conditions (16), (17), and (18) in Proposition 4.
A.3 Establishing that x → (1−h0
j (x))/(xh00
j (x)) is decreasing at any x = zj(n)/n







































where xj = zj/nj and j = p,s. This inequality is equivalent to the derivative of x → (1 −
h0
j (x))/(xh00
j (x)) being negative. ¤
Note that if x → (1 − h0
j (x))/(xh00
j (x)) is increasing in some ranges, then at the op-
timum, zj/nj cannot fall in those ranges. Mirrlees (1971) shows that assuming that x →
(1 − h0 (x))/(xh00 (x)) is decreasing ensures that the optimum solution of the one dimensional
problem is such that z(n) is continuous in n.
34A.4 Proof of T00
ps ≤ 0 in Theorem 1














The ﬁrst-order conditions of the household equal 1 − T0
p − h0
p(zp/np)=0and 1 − T0
s −
h0



























¢2 > 0. (40)













































































.F r o m 1 − T0
s = h0
s(zs/ns),w eh a v es i g n (∂zs/∂np)=
−sign(∂T0
s/∂np). The symmetric equation (inverting s and p) follows in the same way. ¤
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
V (γ) is the unique solution of the (strictly) convex minimization problem minV ∈K Φ(V,γ).
Therefore the ﬁrst order conditions of this convex problem are necessary and suﬃcient to charac-
terize the solution V (γ).T h eﬁrst order conditions of the Hamiltonian problem is the following












































⎠ · u =0 , (45)
where ∇· denotes the divergence operator and u is the normal unit vector on ∂D. λ is the
Lagrange multiplier associated to the government budget constraint B(V ) ≥ 0 and is such that
λ =
R














⎦f(n)dn =0 . (46)
When γ =0 , V =( np+ns)/(1+ε) and λ =1is the trivial laissez-faire solution that satisﬁes
(44), (45), and (46)
Abstractly, the PDE (44), (45), and (46) can be written as:
Ξ(V (γ),γ)=0 , (47)
where Ξ is a functional deﬁned for V ∈ K and parameter γ.I f DV Ξ(V (0),0) exists and is
an invertible linear operator, then we can apply the implicit function theorem and obtain that
γ → V (γ) is diﬀerentiable at γ =0with a derivative U = DγV ∈ H1(D) which satisﬁes:
DV Ξ(V (0),0)U + DγΞ(V (0),0) = 0. (48)
Note that this equation corresponds exactly to diﬀerentiating (47) with respect to γ (at γ =0 )
and applying the standard chain-rule for diﬀerentiation. Using standard diﬀerentiation rules,



















· u =0 , (50)
and the linearized budget constraint:
36Z
D
Uf(n)dn =0 . (51)
The linear elliptic PDE problem (49) and (50) is a standard problem of the form ∇ ·
(P(n)∇U)=K(n),w i t hP(n) diagonal two-by-two matrix with diagonal coeﬃcients npf(n)
and nsf(n) bounded away from zero on D.T h e m a t r i x P(n) is therefore coercive33 and is
smooth on ¯ D. Furthermore, the boundary condition can be written as P(n)∇U ·u =0which is
the co-normal derivative of the elliptic and coercive operator ∇·(P(n)∇). Finally, the problem
satisﬁes the integrability condition
R
D K(n)dn =0 .
Therefore, the problem (49) and (50) has a unique solution (up to constant) in H1(D) (see
e.g., Brezis, 1983). The linearized budget constraint (51) pins down the constant so that U is
unique. Finally, because ∂D and f(n) are smooth, the solution U is actually smooth (at least
of class C2) (see again Brezis, 1983) on ¯ D.
More generally, in order to demonstrate that the operator DV Ξ(V (0),0) is invertible, we
consider the general equation:
DV Ξ(V (0),0)U = Θ, (52)
which is the Elliptic PDE problem ε∇ · (P(n)∇U)=Θ1(n) on D, with Neumann boundary
condition P(n)∇U · u = Θ2(n) on ∂D, and the linearized budget constraint
R
D Uf(n)dn =
Θ3. This generalized problem also has a unique solution in H1(D) as long as the integrability
condition
R
D Θ1(n)dn = ε
H
∂DΘ2(n)ds is satisﬁed. Therefore, DV Ξ(V (0),0) is an invertible
operator. Thus, we can apply the implicit function theorem and the lemma is demonstrated.
¤
A.6 Proof of Lemma 6
We have u(c,z,n)=c−np(zp/np)1+k/(1+k)−ns(zs/ns)1+k/(1+k) where k =1 /ε.B yd e ﬁnition
of z(n), ∂iV (n)=( k/(k+1))(zi(n)/ni)1+k for i = p,s. Hence, ∇V (n)=∂nu(c(n),z(n),n) where





A(n0 + s · (m − n0),m)(m − n0)ds, (53)
33There is a constant c>0 such that, for any vector v ∈ R
2,a n da n yn ∈ D,w eh a v e :vP(n)v ≥ c|v|
2.
37where A(r,m) is the two-by-two matrix derivative of r → ∂nu(c(r),z(r),m).U s i n g V (n) −
V (n0)=
R 1
0 ∇V (n0 + t(n − n0)) · (n − n0)dt, integrating (53) from m = n0 to m = n implies:






Thus, the lemma is established if we can show that A(n,m) is a non-negative matrix for any






























As u ﬃcient condition for a two-by-two matrix (aij) to be non-negative is that a11 ≥ 0,a 22 ≥ 0
and a11a22 ≥ (a12 + a21)2/4. In the case of the matrix A(n,m) in (54), the ﬁrst two conditions
can be written as ∂zp/∂np ≥ 0,∂z s/∂ns ≥ 0.W e h a v e ∂iV =( k/(k +1 ) ) ( zi(n)/ni)1+k for
i = p,s. Using equality of the cross-partial derivatives of the function V (n),w eh a v e∂2
psV =
k · [zp(n)k/(n1+k
p )]∂zp(n)/∂ns = ∂2
spV = k · [zs(n)k/(n1+k
s )]∂zs(n)/∂np. Using this expression,






























Because D is bounded and bounded away from zero, we can deﬁne K as the ﬁnite upper bound
over n,m ∈ ¯ D of the expression in curly brackets on the right-hand-side above. In that case,
under the conditions of the lemma, we have, for any n,m ∈ D, A(n,m) ≥ 0 and hence global
maximization is established.
A.7 Numerical Simulations
Simulations are performed with MATLAB software and our programs are available upon request.
We select a grid for n,f r o mn =1to ¯ n =4with 1000 elements: (nk)k. Integration along the n
variable is carried out using the trapezoidal approximation. All integration along the q variable
is carried out using explicit closed form solutions using the incomplete β function:
Z V1−V0
0












































We pick qmax =2·w1+1/η so that the fraction of spouses working is normalized in the situation
with no taxes (when w or η change). We set w =1in the simulations presented so that qmax =2 .
Simulations proceed by iteration:
We start with given T0
0, T0
1 vectors, derive all the vector variables z0, z1, V0, V1, ¯ q, T0, T1, λ,
etc. which satisfy the government budget constraint and the transversality conditions. This is
done with a sub-iterative routine that adapts T0 and T1 as the bottom n until those conditions
are satisﬁed. We then use the ﬁrst order conditions (10), (11) from Proposition 1 to compute
new vectors T0
0, T0
1. In order to converge, we use adaptive iterations where we take as the new
vectors T0
0, T0
1, a weighted average of the old vectors and newly computed vectors.
We then repeat the algorithm. This procedure converges to a ﬁxed point in most circum-
stances. The ﬁxed point satisﬁes all the constraints and the ﬁrst order conditions. We check
that the resulting z0 and z1 are non-decreasing so that the ﬁxed point is implementable.
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